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African's View about China's African Policy

Ahmet Yiğitalp Tulga

National Sun Yat Sen University, Asia-Pacific Affairs, Kaohsiung, Taiwan

ABSTRACT

In recent years, PRC has become Africa's biggest economic partner. Across trade, investment, infrastructure, and aid, there is no other country with such depth and breadth of engagement in Africa. China is a rising power and Africa is a continent that is still developing. There is evidence of an unequal parity of force, both financial and political, between the two areas in today's worldwide connection. It will ask questions about Chinese government's diversions and strategies, and their suggestions towards the exchange agreements with African states. This study will examine the researchers conducted by African, Western and Chinese scholars. Their opinions will be considered objectively. From time to time, this study will compare the opinion of African, western and Chinese researchers. This thesis will examine this association in comparison with Africa's old colonial powers, and today enormous exchange inclusion with China. This research aims to analyze the African's view of China's African policy. The main questions it to answer; Is China best model for the development of Africa? And how do African see Chinese influence in Africa. This study analyses political and socio-economic advantages and disadvantages of PRC's Africa policy and relations between PRC and African states. Nowadays, there are a lot of academic research about PRC's African policy. Some of these studies have focused on neo-colonialism. And some of them support PRC's African policy. However, a few studies care about African voice. The motivation of this thesis is to clarify African's view about PRC's African policy and this thesis tries to show African's opinion about Chinese policy and also, whether People's Republic of China's African policies are neo-colonialism or not.

Keywords: China, Africa, African's View, China's African Policy.

1. INTRODUCTION

China's expanding role in the world and also the emergence of Chinese internationalization has been carefully analyzed not only by academics and business leaders but also by press professionals (Wang, 2010). China's growing number of aid to Africa and its political and economic engagement with different countries are attracting more attention and analysis. Especially, China- African countries relation became more and more popular in recent years. Consequently, there is a large and growing literature from policy organizations, academic researchers, and the press on the various aspects of Chinese aid, its policies for overseas countries, and its economic engagement more extensively. However, these researches generally do not care about African's view and African's opinion about China's African policy. This is the greatest deficiency of these studies.

The existence literature covered a given largish literature and multiple topics, but this literature review can only present an illustrative selection of studies and very brief synthesis of some key points seen in the literature. The review focuses mainly on African voice and African's opinion about China's African policy. These topics are central to the analysis of this master thesis.

This thesis will analyze two main views about African's view on China's African aid, investment, and policy. On the one hand, some African people, leader, and media believe that China's African investment, aid, and policy have negative effects while on the other hand, some point out that China's African policy, investment, and aid have positive effects. Particularly in regard to the impacts, Chinese activities have on the African economy (Chemingui and Bchir, 2010; Elu and Price, 2010; Wang, 2010).

Most of the African researchers have a more positive view of China since they studied the issues deeply and took a wide range of evidence to support their conclusions than media articles. Therefore, the evidence and methods used to acquire that evidence are more persuasive. However, some African researchers have a negative impact on China's African policy.

All peer-reviewed articles published on China's presence in Africa, from 2000 to 2017, have been identified for content analysis. FOCAC was established and China became a full member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, coinciding with its rapid move toward Africa. I collected all the publications related to Sino-African business cooperation through institutionally accessible research databases at the time of publication, which was published between 2000 and 2017.

2. METHODS

In this study is used the mixed approach to Quantitative and Qualitative methods. In this study is used qualitative or case study method. However, a number of data have been used to support qualitative method. For this reason, both methods are used in this study. Study critical analysis and evaluation includes three steps. These three steps are;

First, this research tries to define the relevance of the resources and also the validity of the resources about PRC's African policy and PRC- African state relations.

Second, research analyzes African's views about PRC's African policy and according to this analysis, all resources are categorized.

Third, as a result of these researches which are analysed and divided into categories, this thesis is tried to make own inference. In addition to this analysis statistical analysis, related to Sino-African relations, were also used.

3. AFRICAN OPINION ABOUT CHINA'S AFRICAN POLICY

According to Afro barometer's 2016 survey (2016), which is in 36 African states, USA is the most popular national development model for the development of African states. The USA is cited by 30% of respondents as a best national development model. Second popular model for national development model is PRC. PRC is cited by 24% of respondents. PRC took the lead in Central Africa with 35%. Also, in Southern and Northern Africa, PRC matched the USA in popularity. PRC and USA were cited by 24% of respondents as the best development model for Africa.

According to the survey (2016), PRC was the most popular national development model in Cameroon, Sudan, Mozambique, Mali, Tanzania, and Zambia. PRC was cited by 48% of respondents as the best development model for Cameroon. Also, PRC was cited by 36% of respondents as the best development model for Mozambique, Mali, and Sudan.

According to Afrobarometer's survey (2016), PRC was mentioned by 23% of citizens as having great influence in their countries. In this survey, a plurality of 28% of respondents mentioned former colonial power as most influential (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016). PRC ranked second with 23% of respondents.

PRC was most widely perceived as the most influential external power in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Sudan, Zambia, South Africa and Tanzania (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016). Citizens of Zimbabwe perceived China as the most influential external power with 55%. This rate in Mozambique was 52%. PRC was most widely seen as the most influential external power in Southern Africa with 35%. According to the survey (2016), China was seen as a most influential power in Africa by more educated and wealthier citizens.

Across 36 African states, 69% of citizens reported Chinese economic activities in their countries have "some influence" or "a lot of influence" (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016). 27% of respondents reported Chinese activities have "some influence" and 42% of citizens reported Chinese economic activities in their countries have "A lot of influence". 90% of Mali citizens believe that Chinese economic activities have "some" or "A lot of" influence in their country. This rate is 87% in Gabon and 81% in Cameroon and Niger (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016).

According to the survey (2016), most of the Africans welcomed Chinese economic and political influence in their countries. 63% of African citizens evaluated Chinese economic and political influence as "somewhat positive" or "very positive". Also, 22% proportion evaluated Chinese influence as neither positive nor negative. 92% of Mali citizens evaluated Chinese economic and political influence as "somewhat positive" or "very positive" and 84% of Niger citizens evaluated Chinese economic and political influence as positive. Chinese economic and political influence is overwhelmingly seen as "somewhat positive" or "very positive" in regions such as West Africa, Central Africa, and East Africa.

A majority of Africans think that Chinese economic development assistance does a "somewhat good" or "very good" job of meeting African state's development needs (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016). 19% of citizens think that Chinese development assistance does a "somewhat bad" or "very bad" job of meeting their country's development needs. 16% of citizens think that Chinese development assistance as neither good nor bad (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016). 88% of Mali citizens think that Chinese assistance does a good (somewhat or very good) job of meeting Mali's development needs. This proportion is 81% in Cote d' Ivoire, 77% in Nijer and 76% in Guinea and Gabon (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016). 53% of Madagascar citizens think that Chinese assistance does a bad (somewhat or very bad) job of meeting Mali's development needs.

According to Afrobarometer's survey (2016), mostly economic factors shaped African's impressions about China. Some factors are really important for Africans. Thanks to these factors, China has a positive image in their country. These factors are investments in infrastructure and other development projects, the low cost of Chinese products and Chinese business investments (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016).

On the other hand, some factors contributed to negative images of China in Africa. Most of the responses were primarily economic. 35% of respondents think that the poor quality of Chinese products damage China's image and 14% proportion think that Chinese activities in Africa take jobs or business away from locals (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016). Chinese product quality was the most frequently cited negative factor in 26 of the 36 African states (Afrobarometer's survey, 2016).

According to WIN/ Gallup International's 2017 survey (2017), 77% of Sub-Saharan Africans think that China plays an important role for the economy of African states. 28% of Sub-Saharan Africans believe that China plays a very important role for the economy of African states. However, 17% of Africans think that China does not play an important role for the economy of African states (WIN/ Gallup International survey, 2017). 4% of Sub-Saharan Africans think that China plays a very unimportant role for the economy of African states and 10% of Sub-Saharan Africans say that China plays a somewhat unimportant role for the economy of Sub-Saharan African states.

According to same survey (2017), 68% of Sub-Saharan Africans think that role of PRC in the economy of Africa is good for Sub-Saharan African states. However, 23% of Africans states that the role of PRC in the economy of Africa is bad for Sub-Saharan African states (WIN/ Gallup International survey, 2017). 20% of respondents believe that Chinese role in the economy of Sub-Saharan African countries is very good for their countries. Also, 48% of respondents state that Chinese role in the economy of Sub-Saharan African countries is good for their countries. On the other hand, 6% of respondents believe that Chinese role in the economy of Sub-Saharan African countries is very bad for Sub-Saharan African states.

4. POSITIVE RELATIONS EXAMPLE: PRC-SUDAN RELATIONS

Sudan is the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to recognize PRC in 1959. Sudan has been under U.S. sanctions since 1995 in part due to the human rights violations and the country's past ties to radical terrorists (Song, 2017). The same year Sudan president Al-Bashir signed Sudan's first oil deal with PRC (Song, 2017). In 1995, Al-Bashir invited CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) to Sudan and after this time, CNPC started to participate the petroleum bidding and exploration of Sudan (Song, 2017).

When Al-Beshir came to power in Sudan, he decided to travel to PRC in 1995. During his China visit, Al-Beshir requested to help with the development of oil resources (Moro, 2012). In 1996, after this request, Chinese, Malaysian and Indian companies started to take over oil operations in Sudan and these companies together continued where US company's Chevron left off (Moro, 2012). In June 1997, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company was established with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) taking 40 percent ownership and Malaysia's Petronas taking 30 percent. India's ONGC Videsh acquired 25 percent. When these companies took over oil operation in Sudan, there was a conflict in Sudan. Because of conflict, competition in Sudan was low. Three years later, Sudan started to export oil for the first time and for a long time Sudan and PRC reaped benefit from this oil trade (Moro, 2012).

PRC and Sudan have closely linked each other thanks to oil. Also, PRC-Sudan relations has developed quickly since the 1990s. Nowadays, PRC is the largest investor in Sudan and also, PRC is a top trading partner in Sudan. According to Bank of Sudan statistics, China accounted for 76% of Sudan's exports and 22% of imports from 2005 to 2009 (Daniel and Luke, 2011). As mentioned before, the oil cooperation is the core of the relationship between China and Sudan.

PRC uses its veto right to protect Al-Bashir's regime in UN Security Council from UN sanctions. PRC also supplies arms to Sudan (Song, 2017). However, PRC falsely accused of being a major source of armaments for Sudan. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's arms transfer database (2016), arms from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine made up the majority — 77 percent — of imports into the Sudanese arsenal from 2007-2016. China was responsible for a modest 19 percent of all military exports to Sudan over the same period (Song, 2017).

5. NEGATIVE RELATIONS EXAMPLE: PRC-ZAMBIA RELATIONS

Zambia started to recognize PRC in 1964. Zambia recognized PRC just 5 days after gaining independence from Britain (Leslie, 2016). Zambia is the first the southern African country first extended diplomatic recognition to PRC (Kuo, 2017).

Actually, Zambia is one of the oldest PRC's partners in Africa. However, nowadays Zambia is often mentioned as a good example of what can go wrong with Chinese investment in Africa (Kuo, 2017). Chinese mining enterprises started to enter Zambia's mining market/sector over the last decade and a half (Kuo, 2017). Recently, labor disputes between Zambian workers and their Chinese employers become more and more common (Kuo, 2017).

A few remarkable examples of labor disputes in Zambia attracted global attention. In 2005, 52 Zambian workers died at an explosives factory (Malambo, 2015). In 2010, Chinese managers shoot and wounded 11 Zambian mining workers and Zambian police arrested two Chinese managers after they opened fire on protesting Zambian workers (Malambo, 2015). Zambian mining workers frequent protest of low wages and poor working conditions in Chinese companies (Mvula, 2017). In 2012, in the same mine, Zambian mining workers killed a Chinese supervisor and also they seriously wounded another Chinese supervisor (Reuters, 2012).

Recently, labor disputes and anti-Chinese ideology becomes more and more popular in Zambia. Also, it becomes a part of the national discourse in Zambia (Kuo, 2017). Michael Sata, Zambia's former president, won the election in 2011 in part by campaigning on anti-Chinese sentiment (Malambo, 2015). According to Frazer and Lungu (2007), out of 2100 Zambian workers only 52 Zambian workers were permanent employees. The rest of them have neither medical nor pension benefits (Frazer and Lungu, 2007).

On the other hand, in 2015, China become Zambia's largest foreign investor, and in 2016, PRC's ambassador in Zambia declared Zambia one of PRC's main partner. Also, Zambia and PRC's economic and political relationship has grown well (Malambo, 2017). However, at the same time Zambia is the scene of several workers' protests against poor working conditions and accidents, some fatal, in Chinese-owned companies (Malambo, 2017).

6. CONCLUSION

According to Kuo (2017), China is not a "colonialist" country, but World Trade Organization that set the playing field for Africa as an attractive opportunity market for PRC. In African state's price-sensitive marketplace, telecommunications, infrastructure become very reliant upon PRC, which is competitively priced, durable and enjoys strong back-up service compared to its Western competitors. Also, PRC's construction companies could overcome difficulties and they could deliver roads and bridges in African states on budgets that cannot be matched by Western or even local companies.

Actually, as some of the researchers have defined that Chinese investments are not just concentrated in African natural resources. Services are the most common sector, with significant investments in manufacturing as well. This suggests that now China more helps African states to build up their competitiveness.

Also, according to several surveys, from Africa's perspective, Chinese investment, especially in basic infrastructure, is more than welcome. Because African think that this investment plays an important role for the development of African states. However, PRC's arrival could also bring challenges for some of the African states. Especially, 'Made in China' products over the past two decades have had a devastating effect on local manufacturing in Most of the African states. For example, textiles from China decimated the once thriving textile industry in South Africa. Another example is Nigeria. In Nigeria, invasion of Chinese low-priced textile goods caused 80% of Nigerian companies in this industry to close.

This study tries to explain current African's opinion about China's African policy and also, the current situation of China's presence in African states. This research tries to be more objective and less ideological about African's opinion and China's African policy. At the end, this research will analyze whether the relationship between China and African states is beneficial for both sides or not. This study analyzes Sino-African relations on a macro and micro economic level. Finally, this research tries to engage in researching the mutual trust and alliances between PRC and African states.

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